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We model investment decisions regarding innovation and emissions abatement in a dynamic 
theoretical framework. Considering knowledge stock as an impure public good, we study the 
reaction function between one representative agent’s investments in innovation and the 
other agents’ investments in the public characteristic of the impure public good. We 
demonstrate that the reaction function has a positive slope under general conditions and that 
its sensitiveness is affected by assumptions on the elasticity of substitution in the benefit 
function. The positivity of the reaction function is then empirically tested in an econometric 
estimation. We exploit an original sector-based database by gathering innovation efforts as 
well as polluting emissions and economic dimensions over the time span 1996-2005 for 15 
European countries and 23 manufacturing sectors. Empirical results show that sector-based 
innovation investment is positively driven by the public characteristics provided by other 
sectors. Different reactivity strength for different polluting emissions also allows us to 
disclose the role of complementarity in agents’ decisions. 
 
Keywords: impure public goods, environmental externalities, innovation spillovers. 
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1. Introduction 
The current policy agenda of advanced economies, particularly within the European Union 
(EU), has devoted increasing attention to the relationships between environmental 
performance and innovation patterns. Doubts over cost effectiveness and political feasibility 
of regulatory measures for environmental protection give rise to further investigation on 
which kind of policy measures are more suitable for win-win solutions and innovation is 
playing a leading role (OECD, 2011a,b). In a certain sense, environmental regulation and 
innovation patterns are increasingly jointly investigated in order to understand how to 
ensure the conditions for fostering economic development while protecting the environment 
(Jaffe et al., 2003; OECD, 2010; van den Bergh et al., 2007). 
One specific point in this debate relates to the potential influence of innovation efforts on 
environmental performance in a sense that technological advancements may produce 
positive externalities by making less polluting technologies available as a side effect of the 
general innovative process. In order to deal with this issue, we investigate the reasons 
behind an agent’s innovation decision in a context of impure (or mixed) public good 
provision (Cornes and Sandler, 1984, 1986). 
We propose a theoretical model in which we examine how private agents behave in a 
dynamic setting when innovation efforts produce a fully appropriable private characteristic 
and a public characteristic in a typical impure public good framework. We then specifically 
apply this model to environmental issues in this way: the private characteristic of innovation 
could be generally given by higher resource productivity (given by higher labour 
productivity, or higher energy efficiency, for instance), whereas the public characteristic 
could be represented by a general higher availability of accumulated knowledge (in a typical 
knowledge spillover framework) or a more specific effect in terms of lower negative 
environmental externalities (given by a reduction in emissions intensity, for instance). 
Our impure public good can be defined as the total amount of cumulated research and 
development (R&D) efforts, namely an impure public capital good. When the environmental 
specification is given to the two characteristics of the mixed public good, we can interpret 
them as typically technical complements (i.e., with a reduction in energy intensity, we also 
obtain an emissions abatement per unit of output). The investment decisions are then 
analysed in a dynamic framework; as a main testable implication, we focus on the reaction 
function between one agent’s investment in the mixed good (R&D) and the other agents’ 
investment in the public characteristic.   4
We show that the degree of complementarity between the private characteristic and the 
public characteristic of R&D affects the sign of the reaction function. We find that under 
general conditions, the reaction curve has positive slope in a dynamic setting and the 
assumptions on the elasticity of substitution in the benefit function affect its sensitiveness. 
To some extent, the investment decisions of each agent contribute to forming a public good 
whose benefits spill over to all other agents. 
The theoretical findings are then tested by an econometric estimation of the reaction 
function for a panel of European countries over the period 1995-2006. Since dynamics play a 
crucial role in the theoretical model, our representative agent is shaped as a sector unit 
rather than a firm-based statistical unit in order to obtain a long enough time series for a 
panel of countries. The only available and complete dataset in this sense is the National 
Accounting Matrix including Environmental Accounts (NAMEA) available from 
EUROSTAT which provides a large set of EU countries sector-based data on polluting 
emissions as well as on economic information (Costantini et al., 2011). The NAMEA sector 
disaggregation is also suitable for a complete and coherent combination with data on 
innovation efforts, thus giving us an original and unique dataset gathering information on 
the dynamics of innovation jointly with the evolution of pollution patterns. 
The empirical test on the positive slope of the reaction function when the public 
characteristic is shaped as knowledge spillovers reveals that internal R&D investment 
choices are strongly influenced by the global R&D stock accumulated both by the other 
sectors at country level and by the same sector in other countries. 
When we refer to the public characteristic of our mixed good in the more specific 
environmental case, our empirical analysis tests the positivity of the reaction function for 
two different polluting emissions, carbon dioxide (CO2) and non-methane volatile organic 
compounds (NMVOC). The diffusion patterns of these pollutants are different enough to 
define CO2 as global pollution, whereas NMVOC are defined as more localised 
environmental damage. They also differ from a production function point of view since CO2 
is related to energy consumption at general level, whereas NMVOC is closely related to 
more specific usage of fossil fuels as in road transport or chemical use. Finally, although CO2 
is strictly related to climate change with a damage function diffused over a longer time 
horizon (and only with an indirect impact on health), NMVOC emissions directly influence 
health over a shorter horizon. These differences allow us to provide some interesting 
insights not only into the positivity of the reaction function but also into potential   5
relationships between the degree of complementarity between private and public 
components and the nature of the environmental externality under scrutiny. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review. 
Section 3 describes the theoretical model and main testable implications. Section 4 presents 
the empirical strategy whereas Section 5 provides the main empirical results. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Relevant  Literature 
An impure public good, or mixed public good, can be broadly defined as a marketed good 
that jointly provides private and public characteristics, or a good that jointly offers private 
and public benefits (Cornes and Sandler, 1984, 1986). The early adoption of an impure public 
good approach to better understand activity like philanthropy in Cornes and Sandler (1984) 
was further developed by Andreoni (1989, 1990) in his well-known specification of warm-
glow giving.2 The existence of these two characteristics of an impure public good finds 
theoretical basis where the exclusion principle can be applied only to a portion of the benefits 
gained by the consumption of that good (Musgrave, 1959). 
Cornes and Sandler (1994) analyzed how different degrees of substitutability or 
complementarity of the private and public characteristics of the impure public good lead to 
divergent comparative static results. The comparative static allows to investigate how 
changes in the relative magnitude of parameters quantifying the private and the public 
characteristics of the impure public good may influence the reaction function. Changes in 
such parameters lead to different results, according to the fact that the two characteristics 
are substitutes or complements in the agents’ utlity function. A relevant policy implication 
arises from this result: if a policy action may influence the relative magnitude of the two 
characteristics, it is possible to induce different provision levels of the impure public good 
through the distribution of private and public components in the utility function. 
The concept and theoretical models of mixed public good have been applied extensively 
to environmental issues. Environmental protection activities may generate ancillary (or 
secondary) benefits which in some cases may be substantial (Ekins, 1996; Rübbelke, 2002). 
                                                           
2 In the conduction of empirical works Vicary (1997) stressed the relevance of the joint production model of 
Cornes and Sandler with respect to models of public good provision models with only donation as method of 
provision.   6
As an example, primary benefits of greenhouse gas control in terms of a reduction of global 
warming may be followed by co-effects (the ancillary benefits) as less air pollution and 
reduced congestions in transport (Markandya and Rübbelke, 2004). By using an overlapping 
generation integrated assessment model, Bahn and Leach (2008) show that the reduction in 
sulphur dioxide emissions as a result of climate change mitigation policies leads to less 
morbidity and infant mortality, thus increasing the human capital stock accumulation. 
Primary and secondary benefits are also addressed in geographical terms by Pittel and 
Rübbelke (2010), where the authors analyse the implication of two alternative abatement 
solutions, where one type allows reducing solely local polluting emissions, while the other 
mitigates also global emissions. 
A specific point is related to consumption and provision behaviours of environmental-
friendly goods. Kotchen (2005) studies the comparative statics of environmental friendly 
consumption behaviour where green products are treated as impure public goods.3 Kotchen 
and Moore (2007) investigate the incentive for households to participate to a green-
electricity market, while van’t Veld and Kotchen (2011) define as ‘green clubs’ – i.e., those 
programs in which firms voluntarily agree to respect environmental standards as for 
instance eco-labelling - as a situation in which pure non-rivality condition is respected while 
excludable reputation benefits are allowed. The central question they focus on is why firms 
might voluntarily commit themselves to exceed the regulatory requirements, when the 
environmental benefits generated by members of the green clubs are typically public goods. 
Contributions explicitly addressing the role of technological choices in an impure public 
good framework are still spare. Barrett (2006) addresses the role of climate change treaties 
in promoting the joint supply of two public goods, climate change mitigation and the 
creation of new technologies as a knowledge stock which allows reducing mitigation costs. 
The policy implication is the need for an international coordination not only on mitigation 
actions but also on R&D planning. In the same line, Löschel and Rübbelke, (2009) consider 
the influence on impure public good provision in the case where alternative technologies are 
available, and Markandya and Rübbelke (2012) demonstrate that the impure public goods 
are provided in an inefficient way as long as there is no coordination among countries when 
alternative technologies are available. As mentioned by Rübbelke (2003), an important issue 
to be considered in this context is the choice of technologies adopted, which may strongly 
                                                           
3 Kotchen (2006) focuses on the equilibrium results of a similar model, and analyses how green products affect 
environmnetal quality and social welfare.   7
influence the degree of complementarity between the private and public characteristics. 
When focusing on technologies, an additional consideration is required as the knowledge 
itself has been recognized as an impure public goods. Knowledge capital typically has a 
public good property since it can be used in multiple locations simultaneously (Markusen 
and Maskus, 2002), and its benefits can be freely spread around if specific protection 
instruments are not well implemented (Scotchmer, 2004). More exactly, knowledge is ideally 
globally available but because the returns to some forms of knowledge can to some extent be 
appropriated (there is some degree of excludability), knowledge is often thought of as an 
impure public good (Stiglitz, 1999). 
This last consideration leads to adopt a slightly different perspective, where the impure 
public good is the globally available stock of technology (or more generally of knowledge) 
rather than environmental protection. This brings also to investigate which mechanisms 
may explain how private agent’s investment decision in developing new technologies due to 
the impure public good property influence other agents. 
Thus, from a theoretical point of view, treating a ‘technological’ impure public good 
forces us to adopt a dynamic modelling approach in order to investigate investment 
decisions. 
Concerning the empirical side, we follow the system of innovation approach as crucial for 
modelling ancillary (or spillover) benefits in a knowledge production framework. More 
precisely, although a firm-based approach could represent a better analysis of agents’ 
behaviour (Bloom et al., 2010), we believe that in our case the sector level approach is more 
appropriate for targeting and differentiating innovation and environmental policies that 
increase efficiency. Sector-based level behaviour is more effective in explaining structural 
change and economic dynamics (Bogliacino and Pianta, 2011), especially when 
environmental and innovation issues are jointly analysed (Costantini and Mazzanti, 2011). 
The core issue is to understand which drivers influence the investment decision of an 
economic sector by accounting for R&D spillover effects as well as emissions abatement 
options adopted by the other sectors. 
We believe that the sector-based level is the most relevant to our purposes from both an 
applied and a conceptual perspective. With regard to the former, it allows good coverage at 
geographical level, while still maintaining a satisfactory degree of heterogeneity, for an 
investigation of spillover effects. In this sense, according to Wagner and Timmins (2009), 
assessment of the polluting behaviours is highly heterogeneous among sectors, whereas Cole   8
et al. (2010) fully exploit the features of industry-based datasets to analyse how 
environmental performances and trade flows are driven by regulations and agglomeration 
economies. Thus, the sector or industry level of the analysis appears to be crucial to 
providing a more robust possibility of jointly exploring economic and environmental 
performances in depth without losing generality of results. 
With regard to the theoretical layers of our research hypotheses, we refer to the 
paradigm of technological regimes early developed by Malerba and Orsenigo (1997). They 
observe that technological regimes may be a fruitful concept for studying how innovative 
activities are organised differently and industries evolve over time. More relevant for us, 
their main finding is that innovative activities are sector specific, insofar as the features of 
technological environments are common to groups of industries. They therefore find 
differences across sectors in the patterns of innovation and dynamic economic performance 
and similarities across countries. This is a key conceptual justification for studying sectors at 
various degrees of aggregation in a realm in which innovation plays a major role in linking 
economic and environmental performance over a long run scenario of investments by firms 
in private and public goods (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Porter and 
van der Linde, 1995). According to Breschi et al. (2000), this reasoning is not aimed at 
excluding the relevance of national systems of innovation but affirms that an analysis based 




3.  The theoretical model 
3.1 Model  assumptions 
The theoretical model analyses what happens to representative agents’ investment 
decisions concerning R&D efforts in a context of a mixed public good. What makes our 
model different from the existing literature is that the choices made by agents concern 
investment and not consumption. This implies that our analytical framework must be 
dynamic. Consequently, analysis is on the reaction of the dynamic equilibrium solutions to 
changes in parameters.4 
When a general knowledge-based interpretation is adopted, the private characteristic is 
given by higher productivity (or larger market shares or exploitation of monopolistic rents   9
by the leader), and the public characteristic is given by the spillover effects caused by 
partial availability of global knowledge stock. If we assume an environmental point of view, 
we may well interpret the mixed good in a sense that the public characteristic is given by 
emissions abatement, whereas the private characteristic is given by higher resource 
efficiency.5 
We assume that there is a finite set of economic sectors, indexed by  I i ,.., 1 = . There is a 
large number of atomistic identical firms in each sector; we can therefore assume that each 
sector features one representative firm, labelled as firm i ( I i ,..., 1 = ). Each firm employs and 
invests in a kind of capital, R, which has the characteristics of an impure public good since it 
generates either a private characteristic (z) which has no effects on the other firms or a 
public characteristic (a) which may influence other firms’ benefit. 
In our case, the impure public capital good (R) can be represented by knowledge capital 
given by R&D stock. As a mere example, when the more stringent environmental approach 
is adopted, we can consider the private characteristic (z) as benefits arising from new 
production techniques that ensure higher energy efficiency, whereas the public characteristic 
(a) can be represented by energy-related emission intensity reduction. In other words, 
investing in R&D activities produces the same amount of goods with less energy 
consumption and consequently lower polluting emissions. While efficiency gains are clearly 
fully appropriable by the firm i, benefits from pollution abatement will also be advantageous 
for the other firms. 
Since R has the characteristic of an impure public good, each unit of R is such that: 
 
(1)  R z α =    0 > α   given, 
(2)  R a β =    0 > β   given, 
 
where α and β are exogenously given coefficients reflecting a simple process, whereas z and 
a are jointly generated in fixed proportion by one unit of R. 
Therefore, we assume that whenever a firm invests in one unit of R, it invests in α  given 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 We essentially propose in a dynamic framework some of the issues analysed by Cornes and Sandler (1994). 
5 We may address exemplificative benefits arising by abatement efforts from other firms. A decrease in 
polluting emissions will reduce environmental damage and related recovery costs (given by productivity losses 
due for instance to higher morbility of the employees). If some physical targets on emissions level are a binding 
constraint for production process, the higher availability of new technologies for emissions abatement   10
units of the private characteristic and in β  given units of the public characteristic, and the 
two components of the stock are complements, hence increasing either one makes increasing 
the other more attractive (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). 
Moreover, since a also exerts effects on the other firms and vice versa, we define the total 
investment amount in the public characteristic by all firms but i as follows: 
 






j i R a A β    j , i ∀ . 
 
Hence, the whole quantity of the public characteristic (A) is given by the sum of the single 
contributions by each single firm as: 
 






i A a   R a A ≠
= =




by assuming that all firms are equally productive in providing the public good.6 
We adopt the Nash-Cournot assumption that the single firm i regards  i A≠  as 
exogenously given.7 
From eqs. (1)-(4) the investment of firm i in one unit of R has therefore three effects: (i) an 
increase in firm i’s private benefits due to the private characteristic ( R z α = ); (ii) an increase 
in that firm’s private benefits due to the public characteristic ( R a β = ); (iii) an increase in the 
total amount of public characteristic (A) available to all firms. 
Let us now describe the optimisation problem in a dynamic setting. Firm i’s benefit 
function on the impure public capital good at time t (Rt) is represented as: 
 
(5)  () () []
1 1 1 − − −







α β t t t R A R ) R ( B . 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
developed by other firms may help to increase the speed of diffusion process of environmental-friendly 
technologies and consequently reduce implementation costs. 
6 It would also be possible to include in the analysis the effect of differing productivities (Cornes and Sandler, 
1989; Kotchen, 2009). Whilst important, this issue complicates the task of analyzing the reaction function in a 
dynamic setting. Therefore, in this paper we limit to the homogenous productivities case. 
7 For simplicity of notations, since in our analysis we always refer to firm i, we will omit the subscript i in the 
remaining test.   11
From eq. (2), we can re-write: 
 
(6)  () () []
1 1 1 − − −







α t t t R A a ) R ( B , 
 
where  ( ) +∞ ∈ , 0 σ  is the elasticity of substitution between the two benefit components: (i) 
the public component given by the contribution of firm i (a), and the contribution of all the 
other firms ( ≠ A ); (ii) the private component ( R α ). As already mentioned, we are interested 
in the relationship of complementarity/substitutability between the two benefit 
components. Consequently, we state that when  1 > σ  the two components (A and  R α ) are 
(gross) substitutes, whereas for  1 < σ  the two components are (gross) complements, while 
we ignore the Cobb-Douglas case of  1 = σ . 
We can see two different relevant complementarities: a technical complementarity defined 
by the impure public good’s joint provision of private and public characteristics and an 
economic complementarity that relates specifically to the benefit function specification. 
Firm i’s cost function of the R&D investments at time t is defined as: 
 










) I ( p








) I ( p
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where  ) I ( p t  is the real price of the investment resources in R&D at time t. We assume that 
) I ( p t  is non-decreasing in It. This captures in reduced form the idea that there is an 
increasing opportunity cost for the other firms of employing scientists and engineers to 
develop new knowledge (Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Goulder and Schneider, 1999). 
With regard to the firm i’s adjustment cost function of R&D capital stock, it is defined, 
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3.2 Equilibrium  solutions 
Each firm has an infinite lifespan and discounts the future with the discount factor ρ in its 
net benefit maximisation function. Rt is the state variable and It is the costate variable. 
For simplicity of analysis, we assume that net benefit  ) R ( t Π is defined as gross benefits 
minus R&D cost as: 
 
(8)  ) R ( C ) R ( B ) R ( t t t − = Π . 
 
Formally, the optimisation problem of firm i becomes: 
 










t t t R I R δ − = & , 
0 0 R Rt = = , 
 
where  δ is the standard capital depreciation rate and the current-value Hamiltonian 
associated with the optimisation problem is given by: 
 
) R I ( l ) I ( K ) R ( ) l , I , R ( H t t t t t t t t C δ − + − Π = . 
 























− = ρ & . 
Assuming that 
1 − = )) x ( K ( ) x ( f
' , the optimality equation of the current-value 
Hamiltonian, the state and costate equations become: 
 
) l ( f I t t =  
t t t R ) l ( f R δ − = & ;   13
t t
'
t l ) ( ) R ( l ρ δ + + Π − = & . 
 
The equations for the equilibrium are: 
 




















from which we obtain: 
 


















3.3  The reaction function 
The present section is devoted to analysis of the reaction function between one firm’s 
investment in R&D and another firms’ investment in the public characteristic, A≠. 
By differentiating eq. (8), with respect to A≠  we get: 
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for 
* R R =  we obtain the following: 

















We can therefore specify the behaviour of the reaction curve in three special cases, 
depending on the parameters α  and σ . In particular, expanding the previous relation by 
means of a Taylor series up to the dominant order around   0 = α ;  +∞ = σ  or  0 = σ , we 
obtain the following propositions: 
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Propositions 3 and 4 show that the reaction curve is more sensitive (firm i’s investments 
in R&D react more promptly to the other firms’ decisions on the public characteristic) for 
smaller values of the elasticity of substitution. In the first case ( ∞ → σ ), the reaction 
function is a power function. In the second case ( 0 → σ ), the reaction function is 
exponential. The effect of complements and substitutes cases are therefore assessed on a 
relative basis. 
From these results, we can make some interesting considerations about one firm’s 
investment decisions in R&D and the other firms’ investment decisions in the public 
characteristic in a dynamic framework. 
The first relevant consideration comes from Proposition 1: in equilibrium the reaction 
function between one firm’s investments in R&D and other firms’ investments in the public 
characteristic is positive. 
The first question that deserves an answer is what does a positive reaction function 
imply? 
If we adopt a knowledge-based view, we may well interpret our theoretical results in a 
realm of consolidated knowledge spillovers. When the single firm’s investment decisions in 
the knowledge capital good are influenced by the part of the global knowledge stock that is 
freely appropriable, we recognise the fact that the existence of a fully appropriable (private) 
benefit of the mixed good may positively influence the knowledge accumulation process. 
Let us then adopt an environmental view where the public component is given by 
emissions abatement. Since according to eq. (2) whenever a firm invests in one unit of R&D, 
it invests in β  units of emissions abatement too, a positive reaction between one firm’s   16
investment in emissions abatement and other firms’ investment in emissions abatement must 
also exist. This leads to clear implications for the free riding problem. It means that each 
firm reacts positively to the other firms’ investment in emissions abatement since the 
investment in emissions abatement by each firm is increased by the other firms’ investments. 
This leads to an individual equilibrium choice of emissions abatement that can go beyond 
legal and contractual obligations. We can conclude that this cooperative behaviour is 
stimulated by the cumulativeness of past investment in this mixed good, including its public 
characteristic. 
This result may help to explain why in some cases environmental performance of firms 
goes beyond the effective abatement target implemented by regulatory policies. When a 
private (fully appropriable) component is part of the mixed good and the public component is 
strictly complementary, it may well be that the overall result is an emission level that is 
lower than the policy target. This result may open discussion on the relevant policy issue of 
optimal environmental targets, but it goes beyond the scope of this paper.8 
Consequently, the second question is why is the reaction function positive? 
R&D is a mixed capital good by assumption and the technological consequence is the 
complementarity between the private characteristic ( R α ) and the public characteristic ( R β ). 
In actual fact, the only case in which the firm’s investment in R&D does not react with 
respect to  ≠ A  is when the private characteristic of R&D is very small, that is when  0 → α  
(see Proposition 2 above). If R&D was a pure public capital, the single firm’s R&D 
investment would not react positively to the other firms’ investment in the public 
component. 
Moreover with Proposition 3 and 4, we see that the reaction of R with respect to  ≠ A  is 
stronger when the private and the public components of the benefit function are 
complements than when the two components are substitutes. In the first case, an increase in 
the other firms’ investment in the public component increases the single firm’s marginal 
benefit of accumulating the complementary private component. Therefore, each firm now 
wishes to increase its own investment of the private component and, consequently, the 
overall mixed capital good. In this way, through the extra investment in R&D, each firm 
                                                           
8 This discussion also shows potential and fruitful connections between this theoretical framework and notions 
of appropriability, complementarity and cumulativeness that are pre-conditions of innovation along typical 
Schumpeterian patterns of creative accumulation (Breschi et al., 2000). In the dynamics of these technological 
regimes, imitative behaviours and spillovers (Malerba, 2006) can consolidate positive reaction functions both 
considering agents belonging to a national industry or sectors located in different countries.   17
determines an increase in its investment in the public component too. 
 
 
4.  The empirical framework 
4.1. Modelling  strategy 
In order to empirically test the positive slope of the reaction function, we rely on analytical 
instruments available in the knowledge spillovers literature. More precisely, we refer to 
knowledge spillovers as a key driver for the internal knowledge production function where 
technology produced by other firms (or sectors9) can be generally defined as the efforts in 







j i R a A β ). To this end, specific attention should be paid to how spillovers 
coming from decisions by other firms are modelled. 
In this empirical framework, our agents are given by I manufacturing sectors. The public 
component of the mixed good can be represented either by a general knowledge spillover 
effect or a more specific environmental spillover effect, here modelled as total emissions of 
each sector in the sense that if total emissions are decreasing, given a certain level of value 
added, we implicitly assume that emission intensity is decreasing as well. In this sense, if the 
reaction function is positive, we expect to find a positive sign for the coefficient estimated for 
A≠ when knowledge spillovers are considered and a negative sign if an environmental 
spillovers effect is under scrutiny. 
Let us now consider how to shape spillover effects by accounting for recent advancements 
in the economics of innovation discipline. Very broadly, knowledge spills from one agent to 
another in a twofold manner (Glaeser et al., 1992). In a Jacob-type externality frame, we 
argue that knowledge produced by other sectors may be a useful input for the domestic 
knowledge production function of each sector. In a Marshall-type externality setting, 
knowledge only flows across homogeneous sectors. We can disentangle these two effects 
since our dataset has both a sector and a cross-country dimension. We control for Jacob type 
externality considering potential effects of R&D choices by other sectors located in the same 
country, whereas we account for Marshall-type externalities by considering the potential 
influence of innovation decisions by similar sectors located in other countries. Accounting 
                                                           
9 In the theoretical model, we assume that each sector features one representative firm, labelled as firm i.   18
for R&D spillovers allows us to disentangle the effects strictly related to abatement 
decisions more easily from the more general innovative behaviour captured here by 
knowledge externalities. 
We can rely on the concepts of cognitive proximity and absorptive capacity to capture the 
public component of the cumulated knowledge stock. Especially when a Jacob-type 
externality is considered, there is growing consensus on the need to account for the notion 
of cognitive proximity since the probability that innovation spills from one sector to another 
strongly depends on the absorptive capacity of the receiving sector and knowledge will be 
more likely to diffuse when competences and knowledge stocks of the inventors and adopters 
are closely related (Antonelli et al., 2011; Boschma and Iammarino, 2009). Conversely, when 
Marshall-type externalities are the conceptual framework used to model the public 
component, geographical distance may also influence the strength of innovation spillovers 
since face to face contacts and all other features related to personal exchanges (such as 
language contiguity or transportation facilities) may influence the absorptive capacity (or in 
other words, the ability to transform knowledge produced abroad into own innovative 
capacity). 
With regard to cognitive proximity, Frenken et al. (2007) propose adopting an index that 
captures the technological relatedness between industrial sectors by computing the 
similarity between two sectors’ input mix. In line with Los and Timmer (2005), we have 
taken the amount of capital stock (K) and number of employees (L) for each sector as inputs, 
resulting in a similarity matrix for technological relatedness (tr) computed on the basis of 
capital labour ratios. In our exercise we have C  countries ( C ,..., , c 2 1 = ) and I sectors 
( I ,..., , i 2 1 = ).10 The resulting weighting system for aggregating innovation efforts in a 
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whereas for intra-sector Marshall-type externalities we have: 
 
                                                           
10 For the sake of simplicity, we omit the temporal dimension from mathematical notations but all variables 
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The final knowledge stock produced “abroad” results in several alternative measures 
according to the weighting system adopted. When Jacob-type externalities are scrutinised, 
the public component is approximated by a spillover effect modelled as the sum of R&D 
stock by the other I-1 sectors (at country level) weighted by eq. (11), as follows: 
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When inter-country Marshallian-type spillovers are investigated, there are, according to 
Bode (2004), several alternative criteria for transforming geographical distances into spatial 
weights. For the sake of simplicity, we have only considered the pure inverse distances, 
assuming that the intensity of inter-country knowledge spillovers may be subject to spatial 
transaction costs in the sense that the intensity of influences between any two regions 
diminishes continuously with increasing distance. In this case, we consider that the smaller 
the distance between country c and any other region s, the higher the weight assigned to s 
with respect to its influence on c. Hence, the weight assigned to each country s ( c s ≠ ∀ ) is 
proportional to the inverse distance between c and s. Summing up, the sum of R&D efforts 
by the other C-1 countries (at sector level) may be aggregated on the basis of a cognitive 
proximity criterion given by eq. (12): 
 











or alternatively, R&D efforts may also be aggregated on the basis of a geographical 
proximity criterion, resulting in a double weighting system: 
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where 
1 −
cs d  stands for the inverse of the pure geographical distance (km) between economic 
centres. 
Summing up, we can interpret the chosen weighting system as an empirical quantification 
of the value assumed by the parameter β  in the theoretical model. 
Since geographical distance may also influence to which extent abatement efforts in the 
same sector outside the country will play a role in the domestic investment decisions in the 
mixed capital good by sector k, we have applied the same geographical weighting system as 
for R&D. Accordingly, the public component of the mixed capital good provided by 
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when geographical distances are ignored, or alternatively by: 
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if we consider that the degree of influence of the public component on the reaction function 
decreases with distance. When inter-sector influences are considered, the public component 
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Summing up, we have one type of knowledge spillovers given by eq. (13) and one 
environmental spillovers given by eq. (18) when inter-sector relationships are considered, 
whereas we can test two versions of knowledge spillovers as eqs. (14)-(15) and 
environmental spillovers as eqs. (16)-(17) when we account for inter-country relationships. 
 
4.2. The  dataset   21
In order to construct an analytical framework of this type, we exploit an original dataset 
that derives from a combination of EUROSTAT and OECD sources at sector as well as 
country level. Our panel includes 15 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom) and 23 manufacturing sectors covering all industries classified at 
the 2-digit ISIC Rev 3 level, in a time span between 1995 and 2006. Polluting emissions at 
sector level are based on the NAMEA approach (National Accounting Matrix including 
Environmental Accounts) available from EUROSTAT,11 whereas all data for R&D, value 
added, capital and labour are taken from EUROSTAT and OECD-STAN. Data on bilateral 
geodesic distances are available from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII). 
The innovative efforts should be modelled as changes in the knowledge stock, which is 
coherent with the temporal dynamics developed by equilibrium solutions in the theoretical 
model. Accordingly, the knowledge stock for R&D expenditures is as follows: 
 
) t ( ci ) t ( ci ) t ( ci I ) d ( R R + − ⋅ = − 1 1  
 
given that the initial stock is measured by  () () ) d g /( I R t ci t ci + =
0 0  where g is the sector-
specific average annual growth rate of constant price R&D expenditures throughout the 
period and d = 0.15 is the standard depreciation rate for R&D-based knowledge stock 
(Keller, 2004). 
We focus on two main environmental externalities, related to CO2 and NMVOC 
emissions, as representative of two distinguished diffusion patterns, a global one (CO2) and a 
more localised one (NMVOC). The comparison of results is aimed at highlighting 
potentially different sector strategies in this mixed good framework and accounting for 
differences between global and local externalities since the public benefits associated with 
the former are in principle more influential because the relative magnitude of the public 
component of the mixed good is larger than in the local externality case. 
                                                           
11 NAMEA contains data on different polluting and greenhouse gas emissions (CO2, CH4, NMVOC, CO, SOx, 
NOx). The first NAMEA was developed by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics and analysed by Ike (1999), 
Keuning et al. (1999), Steenge (1999), and Vaze (1999) in relation to the possible policy implications deriving 
from sector-specific environmental performance. In the NAMEA tables, environmental pressures, in particular 
air emissions, and economic data (value added, final consumption expenditures and full-time equivalent job) are 
assigned to the economic branches of resident units directly responsible for environmental and economic 
phenomena.   22
 
4.3.  The econometric strategy 
The final equation to be estimated should account for both sector-specific as well as country 
features in order to detect all potential drivers affecting the knowledge production function 
that can be interpreted in a national or sectoral system of innovation realm. More 
importantly, our theoretical results tell us how investment decisions on innovative efforts 
move over time, forcing us to adopt a dynamic panel estimator. Moving from eq. (5), the 
final log linear equation to be empirically estimated in a panel context is thus given by: 
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when intra-sector cross-country spillovers are under investigation.12 
According to the theoretical model, we can proxy the total value of the mixed capital 
good by sector i located in country c as  cit R R ≈  where the private component of the mixed 
good as the appropriable part of R&D investments is given by value added of each sector 
( cit y R ≈ α ), whereas the public component is given by knowledge or environmental 
spillovers.13 
Since the theoretical model is set as an intertemporal maximisation problem, our 
estimation technique should account for equilibrium growth rates rather than working with 
linear variables. According to Becker and Pain (2008) and Ulku (2007), the best way to deal 
with dynamic estimation in a panel context when a knowledge production function is under 
investigation is to adopt a panel error correction model as the recently developed system 
GMM (sys-GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) since it allows for increasing 
                                                           
12 In both specifications, all variables are expressed in log terms. 
13 Remembering that when environmental externalities are under scrutiny, our public component is expressed 
as total emissions per unit of value added (as a sort of emission intensity measure), according to the theoretical 
model, the reaction function is found to be positive if the coefficient is negative, revealing that decreasing 
emission intensity (given by abatement efforts) by the other agents positively influence internal investment 
behaviour in innovative activity.   23
efficiency when we work with a dependent variable that is highly persistent over time as 
well as with potential endogeneity of some explanatory variables. 
Generally speaking, a dynamic panel estimator is appropriate when the dependent 
variable is quite persistent over time, which is exactly our case.14 More precisely, the sys-
GMM estimator seems to be more efficient than simple Arellano-Bond GMM (diff-GMM) 
since the latter has finite sample bias and poor precision when the series are strongly 
persistent. Moreover, as shown in Bond et al. (2001), when the number of time series 
observations is small whereas N is relatively large (in our case 12 and 354, respectively), 
there are dramatic efficiency gains from using the system rather than the difference GMM. 
Although our dataset is large in its NxT matrix and thus in principle fully coherent with 
sys-GMM, inconsistency should always be considered (Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 
1999). Hence, we have applied the comparative strategy suggested by Bond (2002) as a rule 
of thumb since sys-GMM is highly recommended when the value of the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable using a sys-GMM is in between the values of the same coefficient 
estimated with fixed effects as the lower bound and OLS as the upper bound, whereas diff-
GMM gives an underestimation of the coefficient which is what we verify when performing 
these estimations on our empirical model.15 
 
 
5. Empirical  results 
We first test the positive slope of the reaction function from an inter-sector perspective 
where Jacob-type externalities are considered, accounting for both polluting emissions 
(Table 1). As a general consideration, our modelling strategy is to include only necessary 
explanatory variables in order to reduce potential multicollinearity arising from adding 
many covariates to GMM estimators. More importantly, since in our theoretical model the 
public component is generally defined, without explicit characterisation in terms of 
knowledge vs. environmental externalities, we have tested the two spillover effects both 
separately and jointly.16 
                                                           
14 Wooldridge F-test equal to 129.86***, with H0=absence of autocorrelation of the residuals rejected. 
15 All results for robustness checks are available upon request from the authors. As a general remark, all 
estimations with sys-GMM provide coefficients for the lagged dependent variable respecting the intermediate 
position in the variation range for different estimators as suggested by Bond (2002). 
16 From a general point of view, the robustness of results relies on an AR test on residual terms for the 
temporal structure and a Sargan test on overidentifying instruments for endogeneity issues. Statistical   24
Turning to an interpretation of our results in the light of the theoretical model, we can 
see that the value added ( i cit ValAd y = ) of sector i in country c positively relates to R&D 
investments. This is to be expected as common evidence in this stream of economics of 
innovation literature (Becker and Pain, 2008) since the larger profit gains at sector level are, 
the more likely it is that competitive advantage will be maintained on the innovation side in 
well-known Schumpeterian monopolistic behaviour. This is exactly what we expected from 
our benefit function of the representative agent where a positive reaction function between 
the private component and the mixed capital good is clearly addressed. 
Regarding inter-sector spillovers, Column 1 in Table 1 shows that the main test on A≠ 
modelled as eq. (13) leads us to confirm the theoretical result that R&D spillovers (T≠i) are 
part of a mixed good technology with a positive and statistically robust coefficient. 
 
Table 1 – CO2 and NMVOC abatement decisions within country 
Ri(t-1) 0.852 *** 0.871 *** 0.850 *** 0.864 *** 0.860 ***
(152.58) (189.98) (259.87) (188.39) (228.03)
ValAdi 0.028 *** 0.102 *** 0.115 *** 0.078 *** 0.067 ***
(11.10) (42.62) (69.73) (30.78) (35.78)
T≠i  0.059 *** 0.046 *** 0.027 ***
(8.03) (13.39) (7.92)
E≠i  -0.188 *** -0.150 *** -0.080 *** -0.075 ***
(-6.07) (-8.19) (-5.26) (-7.62)
Constant 2.050 *** 2.397 *** 0.782 *** 1.913 *** 1.703 ***
(5.62) (6.92) (3.62) (7.33) (11.71)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Obs. 3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391      
Wald test 79,213     107,795  275,772  102,934  192,664  
AR (1) -3.366 (0.0) -3.481 (0.0) -3.478 (0.0) -3.478 (0.0) -3.448 (0.0)
AR (2) -1.890 (0.1) -1.970 (0.0) -1.956 (0.1) -1.968 (0.1) -1.937 (0.1)
Sargan test 120.07 (0.2) 120.80 (0.2) 177.80 (0.1) 138.96 (0.1) 171.05 (0.1)
CO2 NMVOC KNOW-spill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 
Notes: Two-step robust specification has been used. Robust t-statistics in absolute value are shown in brackets. (**), (***) 
Significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests-with distribution N(0, 1) on the serial 
correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-square test for over identification of restrictions. 
 
Let us then quantify the role of a public component modelled as environmental 
externalities. From Columns 2 and 4 (Table 1) we show that the test on A≠ modelled 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
robustness of coefficients for the lagged dependent variable respecting the rule of thumb mentioned above 
gives us final justification for using sys-GMM.   25
according to eq. (18) leads us to do not reject the theoretical result for environmental 
spillovers as well. According to Proposition 1, the covariate E≠i  shows that there is a positive 
influence of other sectors’ emissions abatement efforts over internal R&D investment 
choice.17 
For both pollutants we can see that coefficients for T≠i and E≠i remain statistically robust 
and with the expected sign when knowledge and environmental spillover effects are jointly 
introduced, whereas their magnitude decreases slightly when only one spillover effect is 
introduced. The fact that persistence over time is slightly reduced (coefficient for the lagged 
dependent variable is lower in Columns 3 and 5) shows that a joint spillover effect allows 
better explaining R&D investment decisions. 
We can also see that coefficients for E≠i are always higher than those related to T≠i for 
both CO2 and NMVOC, revealing the strong and persistent positivity of the reaction 
function with respect to the specific environmental externality under scrutiny. Since 
coefficients represent elasticities, we should interpret this last piece of evidence carefully. In 
fact, we can only say that an increase in abatement efforts by the other agents will increase 
the propensity to invest in R&D activities by each agent and that this impulse is greater 
than in knowledge spillovers. A potential explanation of this specific result may pass 
through the effect on the coefficient relative to the private component ( i cit ValAd y = ) which 
increases when environmental spillovers are included. When the public component is 
explicitly considered as an environmental spillover effect, the coefficient for the private 
component is higher for both pollutants. We can interpret this statistical evidence as a sign 
of an higher influence of the public component on the marginal benefit related to the private 
component, which dynamically fosters investments in R&D. Moreover, this effect is higher 
for CO2 emissions which we consider by definition the environmental externality with 
higher technical complementarity and lower substitutability in the benefit function. 
Turning to cross-country intra-sector spillover effects, Tables 2 and 3 show results for 
CO2 and NMVOC respectively. It is then a sector-specific effect which should capture the 
spillover arising from partnership and technological flows occurring within the same 
economic branch. 
                                                           
17 By using a difference-based estimation method, we can interpret the coefficient as an elasticity in terms of 
the reaction of investment choice in R&D with respect to changes in emissions level (i.e., abatement efforts) of 
the other agents (where agents in this specification correspond to other sectors in the same country). This 
proves that the spillover effect associated with the abatement carried out by other sectors increases investment 
in the mixed capital good.   26
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 reveal that environmental spillovers do not play any role in 
influencing R&D investments when CO2 abatement efforts are under scrutiny. This 
evidence is hardly surprising if we think about the pervasiveness of the emission source, i.e. 
energy consumption, in all manufacturing sectors. In other words, in this case an 
environmental national system of innovation seems to prevail over a sectoral one. 
 
Table 2 – CO2 abatement decisions (outside the country, same sector) 
RTi(t-1) 0.882 *** 0.889 *** 0.851 *** 0.872 *** 0.847 *** 0.870 ***
(154.25) (147.63) (117.00) (157.92) (111.45) (150.02)
ValAdi 0.058 *** 0.027 *** 0.055 *** 0.056 *** 0.065 *** 0.051 ***
(17.19) (7.37) (18.17) (18.04) (20.80) (15.80)
E
1












≠c  0.043 *** 0.070 ***
(3.66) (5.82)
Constant 2.688 *** 2.277 ** 0.714 1.715 *** -0.85 0.908 **
(2.69) (2.30) (1.23) (2.81) (-1.86) (2.23)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Obs. 3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391      
Wald test 55,487     52,018     72,588     78,251     75,700     81,157    
AR (1) -3.432 (0.0) -3.384 (0.0) -3.409 (0.0) -3.514 (0.0) -3.404 (0.0) -3.596 (0.0)
AR (2) -1.951 (0.1) -1.923 (0.1) -1.973 (0.1) -2.014 (0.1) -1.986 (0.1) -2.048 (0.1)
Sargan test 100.31 (0.1) 103.94 (0.1) 127.57 (0.1) 116.02 (0.4) 124.19 (0.2) 118.74 (0.3)
(4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (6)
 
Notes: Two-step robust specification has been used. Robust t-statistics in absolute value are shown in brackets. (**), (***) 
Significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests-with distribution N(0, 1) on the serial 
correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-square test for over identification of restrictions. 
 
When knowledge spillovers are also included, we can see that the public component 
shaped as the appropriable part of the knowledge stock accumulated by the same sector 
located in other countries is the only one that influences the reaction function. As a general 
result, it is worth noting that technological relatedness plays a crucial role in explaining the 
influence of knowledge stock produced by the same sector located in other countries on 
domestic R&D investment decisions, whereas geographical proximity alone does not explain 
knowledge flows. In fact, the inclusion of the geographical distance in the weighting system 
only influences the magnitude of the effect, but the positive sign of the coefficient remains 
robust.18 As far as the technological relatedness matrix is concerned, this result reveals that 
                                                           
18 As a robustness check we have estimated knowledge spillovers by considering a pure geographical distance 
matrix. Coefficients in this case are always not statistically robust, reinforcing our choice of modelling the b   27
sector homogeneity in terms of capital labour ratio similarity is also effective when inter-
country spillovers are considered. If we consider the panel of countries examined here as 
well as the macro aggregation of manufacturing sectors, we may well expect the same sector 
in Germany and Hungary to have an input mix that is different enough to give strength to 
technological relatedness. 
In Table 3, as far as the NMVOC abatement spillover effects are concerned, we observe 
that the public component shaped as a specific environmental externality influences the 
reaction function, with an expected and statistically robust negative sign. In this case, the 
distance-based weighting system reinforces the influence of other agents’ behaviour on 
internal R&D investment decisions, meaning that some forms of transactional barriers due 
to geographical features have a role to play. 
If we jointly consider a knowledge and environmental externality spillover effect, the 
R&D investments are positively influenced by the public component irrespective of the 
spillover specification adopted. In this case, the knowledge effect seems to prevail over the 
environmental externality effect, reinforcing our previous result on CO2 emissions since a 
sectoral system of innovation seems to be crucial. 
The different evidence for CO2 and NMVOC when testing the mixed good hypothesis at 
EU level for inter-country effects in the same manufacturing sector highlights the plausible 
role of policy in creating a framework (targets, expectations, etc.) for cooperative behaviours. 
To some extent, within the European Union, CO2 abatement targets are generally decided 
at country level and then distributed among sectors in a national bargaining process. In 
addition, the current energy mix as well as other structural features of sectors are all factors 
influencing this bargaining outcome since CO2 emission cuts must pass through a reduction 
in energy consumption (which is highly pervasive in terms of the number of sectors 
influenced by the policy strategy) or the impulse to renewable energies (which is a policy 
option based on a national strategy). To this purpose, the role of energy efficiency in abating 
CO2 could also explain why its significance is higher with respect to CO2 within national 
boundaries (as results in Table 1 clearly reveal), given that more efficient processes are 
diffusible and compatible with different sectors. 
 
Table 3 – NMVOC abatement decisions (outside the country, same sector) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
coefficient in the theoretical model relying on the cognitive proximity framework. Results for a different 
specification not reported in Tables 2-3 are also robust since we only include E≠c or we test E≠c jointly with the 
two alternative T≠c.   28
RTi(t-1) 0.886 *** 0.877 *** 0.853 *** 0.870 *** 0.856 *** 0.868 ***
(164.53) (159.30) (173.20) (217.83) (164.07) (200.49)
ValAdi 0.073 *** 0.068 *** 0.092 *** 0.073 *** 0.098 *** 0.095 ***
(25.00) (23.78) (41.85) (32.33) (47.30) (39.80)
E
1












≠c  0.069 *** 0.044 ***
(11.05) (7.57)
Constant 1.354 *** 1.784 *** -0.316 0.271 -0.229 0.352
(2.99) (4.56) (-1.09) (0.95) (-0.97) (1.66)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Obs. 3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391       3,391      
Wald test 98,801     78,937     174,406  210,488  180,205  185,889  
AR (1) -3.445 (0.0) -3.444 (0.0) -3.497 (0.0) -3.659 (0.0) -3.505 (0.0) -3.604 (0.0)
AR (2) -1.964 (0.1) -1.961 (0.1) -2.008 (0.1) -2.071 (0.1) -2.012 (0.1) -2.062 (0.1)
Sargan test 121.45 (0.1) 113.67 (0.1) 159.61 (0.1) 159.04 (0.2) 165.01 (0.1) 161.03 (0.1)
(4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (6)
 
Notes: Two-step robust specification has been used. Robust t-statistics in absolute value are shown in brackets. (**), (***) 
Significant p-value at the 5%, 1%, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests-with distribution N(0, 1) on the serial 
correlation of residuals. Sargan Chi-square test for over identification of restrictions. 
 
On the contrary, for NMVOC emissions, the implementation of policy targets are rather 
sector-based, notwithstanding the fact that early adoption at EU level of emission reduction 




We analyse investment decisions in innovation activities in a context where technology is 
characterised by mixed good features. Mixed good can be defined as the total amount of 
R&D accumulated stock. We pay attention to the reaction function between one agent’s 
investment decision in the mixed good and the other agents’ investment decisions in the 
public component of the mixed good. 
The dynamic theoretical investigation shows that the only case in which the agent’s 
investment in R&D does not react with respect to the aggregated public component 
provided by other agents is when the private component of R&D is very small. When the 
                                                           
19 Policies targeting emissions (including NMVOC) have been present at national and EU level for decades, up 
to the new CAFE Directive introduced in 2008. NMVOC were targeted by EU Directives 99/13/EC and 
94/63/EC and are of special importance in chemical, metallurgical and ceramic industries, but also in other 
manufacturing sectors, often giving rise to hot spots in densely agglomerated areas such as industrial districts 
(Belis-Begouignan and Oltra, 2004).   29
private and the public component are complements in the benefit function, an increase in the 
other agents’ investment in the public component increases the marginal benefit of 
accumulating the complementary private component. In this way, through the extra 
investment in R&D, the representative agent also determines an increase in its investments 
in the public component. 
Empirical analysis gives robust results on theoretical findings, related to the positivity of 
the reaction function. While results for knowledge externalities are consistent with a large 
body of literature on this issue, empirical findings on the role of environmental externalities 
are quite original. 
Investments in R&D for each manufacturing sector positively react to environmental 
abatement decisions of the other sectors, and the reaction is higher than in the case of 
knowledge externalities. A comparison between different diffusion paths for global vs. local 
environmental externalities provides insightful additional suggestions. When considering 
CO2 emissions, the sector R&D is mainly triggered by national interactions, which is 
coherent with the national systems of innovation framework. The result is also consistent 
with the fact that CO2 abatement technologies heavily regard energy efficiency that provides 
joint private and public benefits. Thus, the fact that a sector positively reacts by investing 
more when others have abated is theoretically justified by the nature of the good and by the 
specific content of technology involved. The fact that NMVOC abatement efforts by other 
sectors impact R&D investments positively also from abroad means that, in some cases, a 
realm of sectoral systems of innovation is also relevant. 
Overall, an investment in R&D that takes the form of a mixed public good might help 
fostering a general environmental-friendly behaviour, although this effect is likely to be 
strongly emission-specific as well as sector-specific. 
These conclusions deserve some considerations. First of all, we show the existence of a 
“pro-social” behaviour de facto which is not explained by altruism, but is accounted for by the 
complementarity between the two characteristics of the impure public capital good. 
Secondly, we also show that if the private characteristic tends to zero, this behaviour is no 
longer ensured. Hence, with regard to what specifically concerns a reduction in negative 
environmental externalities, we can rely on agents’ voluntary (or extra-targets) behaviour 
only when they perceive benefits also arising from a complementary private characteristic. 
This leads to some relevant policy implications. When a policy target is implemented 
(which can be oriented to a more general innovation impulse or to a specific environmental   30
purpose), it could be achieved more easily if a “pro-social” behaviour were somehow 
triggered. More importantly, this behaviour may also help to foster a win-win solution 
where the achievement of environmental targets goes hand in hand with an increase in the 
competitive advantages driven by innovation dynamics. To this purpose, the reasoning 
behind the optimal policy mix should also include issues on the role of technical 
complementarity between the private and public characteristics. A pure environmental 
regulation approach may be less effective than a mixed approach where specific innovation 
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